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THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
IN WISCONSIN'
By CLAUDE D. STOUT 2
T HIS article has been prompted due to a conviction of some preva-
lence in the legal profession that women, especially married wom-
en, in their urgent demands for more and more legal rights have failed
to appreciate fully the protection that has been provided for them. It
is apropos that woman be fully advised of the advantageous legal po-
sition in which men law makers placed her, and also be informed as to
the loss she must sustain due to her demands for so-called equality
legislation.
The past few years have been marked by new laws, supplemented
by court decisions, materially affecting the legal status of women-
especially married women. A purview of the literature associated with
the agitation for such changes almost leads to the belief that the wom-
en borrowed a page from the methods of war-time propaganda. A
questionnaire of wide circulation contained such statements as the fol-
lowing: "The wife does not participate during the marriage in the in-
crease in property, and the wife does not share in the earnings of chil-
dren unless the husband is dead." Much of such literature consisting
of magazine articles and data used before legislative committees seek-
ing to change existing laws pertaining to domestic relations as to hus-
band and wife, tells but part of the story. The omissions are significant.
Of course the wife does not participate during the marriage in the in-
crease of the husband's property for the very good reason that the
husband bears all losses while he at all times is liable for the wife's
support. Neither should the wife share ifi the earnings of the chil-
dren for the father is legally bound for their support while during
the greater part of minority their custody must be surrendered to the
schools for their education.
Great injustice is done in placing too great emphasis on a particular
instance of apparent discrimination without due consideration of all
rights enjoyed by men and women under the law with reference to
each particular right or disability in its proper relationship to all others.
The legal status of women in the order of domestic relations cannot
be governed entirely by her own viewpoint. Other factors have a more
'This article is the first of a series of three articles; the following two will
appear in Nos. 3 and 4 of Vol. 14 of the REVIEW.
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or less controlling influence. The rights of the husband as the wage
earner are also involved. So also are the more important rights of the
child while society has a superior interest in the family relation to which
the individual rights of all others must give precedence. The legal
rights of men and women, and especially husband and wife, are so
closely interlocked that the privileges and disabilities of each must be
considered together.
The existing legal status of women can best be approached from the
historical viewpoint. The subject will therefore be presented accord-
ing to the following plan:
First: The status of women when Wisconsin first entered the union.
Second: The development, step by step, of the acquisition or rights
not before enjoyed.
Third: Interspersed throughout the discussion, reference to the
court decisions in interpretations of legislation for the benefit of
women.
Fourth: The enactment into law of the so-called "Equal Rights
Statute."
Fifth: A r~sum of the several significant decisions of the Supreme
Court in interpretations of such phases of the Equal Rights Act, known
as Section 6.015, as have been brought to issue before the courts.
It may be said at the outset that the struggle of women to obtain
equal rights has been a bone of contention throughout the entire history
of our state-and the end is not yet. The articles that have appeared
in the law journals and elsewhere have covered but parts of the sub-
ject. Justice Winslow, in 1917, in the MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW, in a
most comprehensive manner discussed the topic entitled, "Property
Rights of Married Women Under Modern Laws." With a keen fore-
sight the great justice prophesied the passage of disabilities of married
women, "not because women ask it, nor because man's gallantry prompts
it, but because justice demands it."
The Ordinance of 1787 established the common law of England in
what is now Wisconsin. The conservative lawyers of the day, being
loath to depart on a too uncharted sea, caused Section 2 of Article XIV
to be inserted in the constitution retaining the principles of the common
law that were not changed therein until altered or repealed by the legis-
lature. As a consequence it will be necessary to refer repeatedly to the
rules of the common law in marking the change from the old to the new
order.
The opening gun in the campaign of women for her rights came in
1846 with the movement for statehood that led to the constitutional con-
vention of that year in which was inserted an article giving property
rights to married women. After many days of heated debate, the
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article was adopted, but not, however, until after the leader of the oppo-
sition had resigned in disgust. The campaign for ratification was most
bitter, the opposition centering around the aforementioned article. The
election for ratification lost by a decisive vote of 60 per cent. Thus,
the first attempt to make Wisconsin a state resulted in failure because
the men were unwilling to grant property rights to married women.
When, in 1848, the second constitutional convention was called, its
members profited by the disastrous experiences of their predecessors
and discreetly adopted a proposed constitution containing no reference
whatever to property rights of married women. This constitution, be-
ing that of 1848, was duly ratified by the people. Therefore, when the
state launched itself into the sisterhood of states the old common law
status of married women as provided in the ordinance of 1787 re-
mained in full force.
Section 1 of Article III of the constitution provided the qufalification
for suffrage, and defined electors as limited to male persons of the age
of twenty-one or upwards possessing the specified requisites. The
women were entirely omitted from the political scheme. The cardinal
principle that applied was that husband and wife were one and the
husband was the one. Its theory accepted and placed upon the mar-
riage vows a literal interpretation, especially in its application to the
legal status of the wife. Throughout the entire history of our state
the judiciary have therefore been obliged to struggle with the ancient
common law rules in developing interpretations to fit modern con-
ditions. The courts, as we shall see, are to be highly commended for
their numerous decisions favorable to married women. In almost every
instance, whenever opportunity afforded, the court has rendered de-
cisions modifying the rigor of the common law rules and, when bound
by a hard and fast common law rule, has repeatedly suggested to the
legislature the advisability of taking action to correct decisions it was
obliged to render of evident inconsistency with the modernized status
of women.
The woman, on her marriage, was immediately hedged around with
numerous disabilities. As the constitution in its original form made no
provision for the married woman, but on the other hand retained the
principles of the common law, the status of married women was sub-
stantially as set forth in the Blackstone with which lawyers of the day
were familiar. In order to present what women in general, and mar-
ried women in particular, have attained, the following disabilities of
the feme covert that applied when the state first entered the union may
be enumerated:
First: All the personal property of the wife, on her marriage, imme-
diately became that of her husband.
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Second: The husband took complete control of all his wife's real
estate of whatsoever kind and the entire proceeds were his to do with
as he pleased.
Third: All the wife's earnings belonged to the husband and were
subject to levy and execution for his debts.
Fourth: If the wife owned any real estate she could convey none of
it without her husband joining with her in her deed of conveyance.
Fifth: Neither could a wife make a will to dispose of any of her own
property without the written consent of her husband.
Sixth: The husband's riglt of curtesy, then as now, applied to the
wife's trust estates, while even at this late date the wife's right to dower
in the equitable estates of the husband is limited. See Will of Prasser,
140 Wis., page 92 and Hortley v. Hartley, 140 Wis., page 282.
Seventh: Furthermore, a wife could not either bring or defend, in
her own name, any action for a tort or injury done her by the wrong
or negligence of another, and any recovery from such an action be-
longed entirely to the husband.
Eighth: The husband was given complete control of the person of
his wife to the extent that he was even permitted to restrain her liberty
at his pleasure.
Ninth: The husband could inflict moderate personal punishment to
compel his wife to behave according to his views. In this respect the
wife occupied a position in the family similar to that of her own minor
children.
Tenth: The wife was not permitted to be the guardian of her own
children by a former marriage.
Eleventh: The wife could not contract for indeed there was no need
under the scheme of the common law for her to do so. She was more
protected than her own minor children whose contracts were voidable
and subject to ratification on attaining majority.
However, the wife did, at this early day, have well established rights.
Most important of all was the homestead right for the wife, then as
now, enjoyed the veto on its sale. Section 52, Chapter 102, Revised
Statutes of 1849 provided as to the homestead as follows:
But such mortgage or other alienation of such land by the owner
thereof, if a married .man, shall not be valid without the signature of
the wife to -the same. [See Williams v. Star, 5 Wis., page 534.]
On the hubsand's death the wife also had, by operation of law, the
dower right which consisted of the endowment of a one-third estate
for life in all the real estate of which the husband, at any time during
the marriage, was seized and to his conveyance of which she did not
join. On her death the remainder went: first, to her father-in-law;
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and if he were deceased, second, to the brothers and sisters of the de-
ceased husband and issue of such brothers and sisters, in equal shares;
and, if the mother-in-law were living, she took the same share as a
brother or sister of the deceased husband. (Chapter 63, Secs. 2 and 3.
Revised Statutes of 1849.)
The first laws of descent gave all the lineal relatives of the deceased
husband an order of preference over the wife in the remainder. In
case no lineal relatives survived, i.e., issue or ancestors, Section 8,
Chapter 63, Revised Statutes of 1849 did permit the wife to come in
as an heir to the fee in the last order next prior to the escheat of the
property to the state due to there being no one else to take by descent
at law.
The husband, then as now, took no curtesy in his deceased wife's
real estate when there were any issue by any former marriage. Sec-
tion 30, Chapter 62, Revised Statutes of 1849 provided:
When any man and his wife shall be seized in her right of any es-
tate of inheritance in lands, the husband shall on the death of his
wife, hold the lands for his life, as tenant thereof by the curtesy, Pro-
vided, that if the wife, at her death, shall leave issue by any former
husband to whom the estate might descend, such issue shall take the
same discharged from the right of the surviving husband to hold the
same as tenant by the curtesy.
The obligations of the husband, at the beginning, applied with vigor
for he was:
First: Liable for all the antenuptial debts of his wife.
Second: He was, during the entire duration of the marriage, respon-
sible for his wife's conduct and was presumed to have consented to
any crimes committed by her in his presence.
Third: And, of course, he has always been liable for the wife's sup-
port.
The first two above have, in the natural course of events, been re-
moved, but it is doubtful whether any change due to woman's urgent
demands for more so-called equality can ever replace or even materially
modify the third duty society places on the husband to support his
wife and minor children.
At the beginning, in addition to the homestead and dower, the widow
was allowed certain allowances in the deceased husband's estate re-
gardless of whether there was a will or not. Those consisted of the
following:
First: All her articles of apparel and ornaments.
Second: The wearing apparel and ornaments, not specifically be-
queathed, of the deceased.
Third: Household furniture of not more than $250 in value.
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Fourth: Other personal property to be selected by her, not exceeding
in value $150.
Fifth: After the funeral expenses and expenses of administration
were paid, the residue of the estate, if not more than $150 in value,
was assigned to the widow for her support and that of the minor
children. (See Section 1 and 4, Chapter 68, Revised Statutes of 1849.)
It is extremely difficult to provide adequate rules to fit all circum-
stances. However, the above provisions for allowances, although sub-
ject to considerable dissatisfaction, remained substantially without
change until within the present generation when more liberal provisions
hereinafter set forth were made. The primary purpose has always been
to conserve the small intestate estate in order that society may best
be served in the safeguards for the education and support of children
of tender years. The modem woman demands that society surrender
more and more of such time honored laws in giving the widow larger
portions of the estate. Society, on the other hand, is reluctant to yield
to the interests of the widow until more women are able to demonstrate
their ability to support the minor children who, by death, have been
deprived of the support of the parent upon whom the legal duty has
always been placed.
Much emphasis has been given by the ardent suffragists in the ridi-
cule of the common law rule that permitted a husband to punish his
wife with a stick no larger than his thumb. The rule was not entirely
beyond reason for, should a wife develop "Carrie Nation" propensities,
such a small stick in the hands of a small husband might prove of little
relief from the payment of a heavy judgment incurred by reason of the
malicious destruction of the property of others by such a wife.
The wife has, however, always enjoyed an established legal status
having many advantages. The first revised statutes of 1849 contained
sections relating to divorce, dower rights, etc., many of which form
the nucleous of the laws of the present. In fact, entire sections and
almost entire chapters pertaining to domestic relations as between hus-
band and wife have survived since 1849 with little substantial change.
Furthermore, a study of the session laws from year to year gives credit
to the men in granting to women additional rights as fast as they were
able to make good use of them. Neither should the impression be
had that when a woman married the law made no provision for any
enjoyment of property by her. The dark cloud had a silver lining.
Chapter 58, Revised Statutes of 1849 contained the following specific
provisions:
First: Section 8 provided, "A general or beneficial power may be
given to a married woman, to dispose, during the marriage, without
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the concurrence of her husband, of lands conveyed or devised to her
in fee."
Second: Subsection 1 of Section 15 provided that "A special and
beneficial power may be granted to a married woman to dispose, dur-
ing the marriage, and without the consent of her husband, of any
estate less than a fee, belonging to her in lands to which the power re-
lates."
From the foregoing it may be said that at no time in the history of
this state was a wife prohibited from the enjoyment of real property
free from the control of her husband of any estate any person desired
to place under a power or trust for her benefit. Our forefathers
traveled in ox carts whereas we travel in automobiles and aeroplanes.
Both traveled with the means and times provided. So also did the
married woman of the earlier day enjoy her separate property, but in
a manner different from our conception of such enjoyment at the pres-
ent day.
A rare parcel is found in Section 17, Chapter 79, Revised Statutes
of 1849 which provided, that in case a wife started suit for divorce,
"the court may on . . . . the petition of the wife prohibit the husband
from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty during the pendency
of the suit." And another in Section 3, Chapter 146, Revised Statutes
of 1858, which provided that, "When a husband and wife were im-
pleaded and the husband absented himself or would not defend the
rights of the wife, if she apply before judgment, she shall be admitted
to defend without her husband."
Regardless of what restrictions were placed around the wife during
coverture when, on the dissolution of the marriage contract, the rights
of the wife were vigorously reasserted. Section 22, Chapter 79, Re-
vised Statutes of 1849 provided on divorce the court may restore to
the wife the whole or such part, as it shall deem just and reasonable of
the personal estate of the wife that shall have come to the husband by
reason of the marriage or for awarding the value thereof and also
the value of any real estate of the wife disposed of by the husband
during the coverture to be paid in money; and the court may require
the husband to dispose on oath what personal estate has come to him
by the marriage, how the same has been disposed of and what remains
in his hands.
The foregoing statute "had teeth" even more so than the similar pro-
visions of Section 247.34 which were derived from the early statute
above cited.
Section 25, Chapter 79, Revised Statutes of 1849 provided that:
When the marriage shall be dissolved by the husband being sen-
tenced to imprisonment for life, and when a divorce be decreed for the
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cause of adultery committed by the husband, or on account of his
being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more,
the wife shall be entitled to her dower in his lands in the same manner
as if he were dead; ....
The husband in the early days, in his responsibility for his wife's
antenuptial debts as well as for her support and conduct, was given
the control of whatever of her property that had not been specifically
placed in trust for her benefit. However, his control carried a trustee-
ship for which he was held to a strict accountability on dissolution of the
marriage. The responsibility of the husband is further illustrated by
Section 2 of Chapter 59, Revised Statutes of 1849 which provided:
A husband and wife may, by their joint deed, convey the real estate
of the wife, in ,like manner as she might do by her separate deed, if
she were unmarried; but the wife shall not be bound by any convenant
contained in such joint deed.
The wife could not convey her real estate unless her husband joined
in her conveyance, however, his control over her disposal of her real
estate relieved her of liability and placed upon him alone responsi-
bility for breach of covenants contained in her conveyance.
Section 7, Chapter 134, Revised Statutes of 1849 which were the ar-
son statutes contained a provision of more than historical interest in
that it was therein provided that punishment for arson applied to a
married woman when the property burned or set on fire belonged to
her husband. Whatever other of her acts for which the husband was
held accountable, nevertheless, the law made an exception for her
punishment should she in a fit of anger burn the building of her own
husband.
By way of illustration of what often happened under these early
provisions, should a man of great wealth in personal property die inte-
sttite leaving a widow and one child, the wife took one-half this per-
sonal property. Should she marry again all this personal property, on
the instant of marriage, became that of her second husband who could
dispose of it at his pleasure. The injustice of such laws was apparent.
Modern progress demanded more adequate provisions to suit the so-
cial order of progress. The matter having been left to the discretion
of the legislature, the lawmakers, to their credit, promptly took action
and, in 1850, following the example set by the sister states of New
York and Pennsylvania, enacted Chapter 44, of the laws of that year
entitled: "An act to provide for the protection of married women in
the enjoyment of their own property." This legislation was a most
radical departure from the old order and set an example for the
more backward states in that it provided:
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First: "That the real estate, and the rents, issues and profits thereof
of any female now married shall not be subject to the disposal of her
husband, but shall be her sole and separate property, as if she were a
single female."
Second. "The real and personal property of any female who may
hereafter marry and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and
the rents, issues and profits thereof, shall not be subject to the dis-
posal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts, and shall continue her
sole and separate property."
Third. "Any married female may receive by inheritance, or by gift,
grant, or devise, or bequest from any person, other than her husband,
and hold to her sole and separate use, and convey and devise, real and
personal property, and any interest or estate therein, and the rents,
issues, and profits, in the same manner and with like effect as if she
were unmarried and the same shall not be subject to the disposal of her
husband nor liable for his debts."
The ink of the governor's signature approving the act had little more
than dried when its legal effect was attacked. The provision authorizing
a married woman to receive property from any person other than her
husband provided a question as to whether, with good reason, a wife
was still incapable of dealing with her husband and to receive title to
property from him in any instance even in payment of his debt to her.
In 1853, in the case of Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis., page 22, the plaintiff
was a widow who had acquired a separate estate from a former hus-
band. While a widow, and of course in control of this sole and separate
estate, she contracted to sell a portion of it to the defendant. Before
payment was made, she married a second time and thereafter was
obliged to bring suit to recover the purchase price. The question
brought to an issue whether a wife could sue alone in such an action.
The learned judge, in the opinion, ruled that it was competent for the
wife to sue alone. In commenting on the act the following choice
language appears: "The act certainly goes far towards clothing one
class of females with strange and manly attributes, yet it is a meritori-
ous statute, designed to remedy a supposed evil of the common law, and
therefore it ought to be liberally construed." Thus, for the first time,
a wife could sue in her owrn name for the recovery of such a right
entirely independent of her husband.
In 1868, in Feller v. Alden, 23 Wisconsin, page 301, a wife who
owned a separate estate consisting of a farm permitted her husband
and children to reside thereon, cultivate the crops, and otherwise carry
on the duties incident to farm life. His creditors sought by levy and
execution to take certain of the crops. The question at issue being
whether the wife, by such a family arrangement, had parted with her
right to the issues, rents, and profits therefrom. The court gave the
most liberal construction possible in its holding that a wife, who owns
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a separate estate, may manage the same through the labor and skill
of the husband and children and that the legal title to the products and
proceeds are still in her and are not necessarily subject to levy and
execution for the debts of her husband. In other words, her employ-
ment of the husband in such an undertaking does not go to prove that
the wife is a party to be held to answer for an attempt to defraud his
creditors.
In 1871, in Beard v. Dedolph, 29 Wisconsin, page 136, the facts at
issue brought squarely before the court the interpretation of the clause
authorizing a married woman to deal with and receive property direct
from her husband. It was an attack directed at the very vitals of the
married woman's separate property act. The wife, at the time of her
marriage, had separate property consisting of money received from a
former husband which was loaned to her husband. He gave her a note
executed to him by third parties in payment of his debt to her. Pay-
ment of the note was resisted on the grounds that a wife could not,
under the provisions of the act, receive title directly from her husband
even in payment of his own debt to her. The decision, however, swept
aside all such objections in holding that the intent of the act, as to the
wife's separate estate, placed her on an equal footing with all the world
including her own husband.
In 1874, in Price v. Osborn, 34 Wisconsin, page 34, a husband pur-
chased property with his own money and caused the deed of conveyance
to run to his wife. Later, the wife sold and transferred the property
to another party whereupon the husband brought action to have her
conveyance set aside. The court laid down the important rule that a
wife can take title to real estate paid for by the husband where it is
deeded to her at his request, that thereupon such property becomes her
separate estate, that she can dispose of it at her pleasure, and that the
husband can not thereafter recover or interfere with her conveyance.
This rule applies even to property occupied as the homestead which
the wife may own in her own name and dispose of at her pleasure
regardless of the fact that the entire consideration was in fact paid
by the husband. This liberal construction illustrates the intent of the
court to construe the married woman's separate act to effectuate its
purpose to give married women complete control of their separate
property of every kind regardless of in what manner it may have been
acquired.
In Carpenter v. Tatro, 36 Wisconsin, page 297, a unique situation
arose where a husband obtained a divorce and in the decree was awarded
the custody of a minor son of about ten years of age. The former wife
soon thereafter remarried. Later it appeared that the father was un-
kind to -the boy who, departing from the legal custody of his father,
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sought refuge with his mother, and she with her second husband fur-
nished a home and necessities. The mother took an assignment of
a claim for the necessities so furnished by the second husband and, on
vengeance bent, brought suit to collect from the former husband. She
pursued the suit through to the Supreme Court, which denied her re-
covery on the grounds that the plaintiff was not the real party in in-
terest. The importance of the decision rests in the holding that a wife
can purchase property of any kind from her husband by using her
separate estate therefor and absolute title to the property so acquired.
In Dayton v. Walsh, 47 Wisconsin, page 113, the decision went far
beyond the expectations of the most ardent advocates of the act. In
this case a married woman who had no separate estate whatever con-
tracted to purchase a farm, in her own name, on her own credit, pro-
ceeded to operate the same with the assistance of her husband and
children, made payments on the notes she had given, and thus pro-
ceeded to acquire a separate estate. Her husband's creditors sought to
take some of the crops in payment of his debts. However, the decision
held that, not having acted in bad faith for the purpose of defrauding
the husband's creditors, the proceeds from the undertaking were the
wife's separate property and hence not subject to her husband's debts.
In McVey v. Green Bay & Minnesota Railway Company, 42 Wis-
consin, page 532, the term "grant" in the act was construed to include
deeds of bargain and sale of land where it was argued with much force
that a married woman was not permitted to acquire real estate by
deed of a bargain and sale, and held that the same came within the pur-
view of the wife's separate estate.
The foregoing .cases illustrate the scope of rights married women
had, at an early date, acquired under this one enactment giving separate
property rights which may be briefly summarized as follows:
First: The wife was placed on the same footing as if unmarried as
to her separate estate.
Second: She was permitted to manage her own property in her own
way free from any control whatever by her husband.
Third: She was permitted to employ her busband or any one else
to operate her separate property or business.
Fourth: She could take the entir6 proceeds from her separate estate
into her exclusive control of absolutely free from any claims of her
husband's creditors.
Fifth: She could place the proceeds of any of her undertakings in
the hands of her husband to invest for her benefit, and her doing so
gave his creditors no property rights or claims thereto.
Sixth: She was permitted to contract to acquire a separate estate en-
tirely on her own credit.
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Seventh: She could bring an action pertaining to separate property
entirely independent of her husband's control.
Eighth: She could deal with her husband, could purchase from him,
and take title to property so acquired by using her separate property
for the purpose.
Ninth: And, most important of all, a wife could take title to property
paid for by her husband and he could not thereafter recover the title
thereto without her consent. Furthermore, her conveyance of such
property to third parties was as valid as any other conveyance of her
property. This rule, of 'course, applies as between husband and wife
for his creditors, on a proper showing, have the right to have such
conveyances as are tainted with. fraud set aside.
The result was that the wife, under these early decisions was given,
quoting the language of the court, "all the necessary ingredients of
separate ownership of property both real and personal and that as a
necessary consequence she became equally as independent of her hus-
band in the assertion and maintenance of her rights in all courts of
justice whenever those rights pertained to her separate property." The
exercise of the right by the husband to sue alone to enforce the property
rights of his wife were erased forever in 1850.
These most liberal interpretations have been consistently followed.
It has even been held that a husband who had no authority from his
wife to sell her land, entered into a contract signing her name to an
agreement to convey was held liable in damages to third parties to the
amount of $2,500 due to his failure to deliver title. A husband who
undertakes to deal with his wife's separate estate, even if his intentions
are, as he believes, for her best interests, nevertheless, does go at his
peril. See Russell v. Ives, 172 Wisconsin, page 123.
The wheel of progress has rolled with increasing momentum through
the years as one by one the disabilities of women have been cast by
the wayside.
In anticipation of the discussion of a later article, the following
chronological order presents a remarkable evolution. The chapter of
the enactment is shown in juxtaposition with the section number of
the present statute in which each provision, in part at least, may now
be found. *
Married Woman's Separate Prop- Chapter 44, Section 246.01.
erty Act. Laws of 1850.
Insurance for benefit of married Chapter 158, Section 246.09.
women. Laws of 1851.
Married women permitted to tran- Chapter 49, Section 246.06.
sact business when the husband failed Laws of 1855.
in his duties, etc.
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Husband a necessary party with the
wife except when the action con-
cern:
A. Her separate property.
B. Or alleged antenuptial debts.
Married women permitted to make
their own wills free from the written
consent of their husbands.
Widow made the heir to the home-
stead when no issue survives the hus-
band.
Coeducation established at the State
University. (See History of Wom-
en's Suffrage, Vol. III, page 642).
Widow made heir to all husband's
estate when no issue and no will.
Husband made heir to all the wife
property when no issue whatsoever
and no will.
Married women authorized to be
guardian, of their own children by a
former marriage.
Husband relieved from liability for
the antenuptial debts of the wife.
Married woman's separate earnings
act.
Females permitted to practice law.
Married women authorized to re-
lease dower by separate conveyance.
Women authorized to act in capacity
of a notary public.
Married woman's separate earnings
act.
Labor provisions amended:
Women not permitted to be em-
ployed in factories more than eight
hours a day, etc.
Husband relieved from liability for
torts of wife.
Judgment against wife for her tort
not a lien on the property of the hus-
band.
Mortgage on exempt personal prop-
erty void without signature of the
wife.
Women permitted to vote at school
elections.
Chapter 120, Sec. 18,
Laws of 1856.
Chapter 91,
Laws of 1859.
Chapter 270, Sec. 2,
Laws of 1864.
Section 260.16.
Chapter 238.
Section 237.02.
1867. Section 36.15.
Chapter 61, Sec. 1,
Laws of 1868.
Chapter 121, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1870.
Chapter 123, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1870.
Chapter 155, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1872.
Chapter 155, Sec. 2.
Laws of 1872.
Chapter 300, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1877.
Chapter 197, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1878.
Chapter 194, Sec. 2
(3)
Laws of 1879.
Chapter 99, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1881.
Chapter 134, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1883.
Chapter 25, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1883.
Chapter 25, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1883.
Chapter 218, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1885.
Chapter 211, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1885.
See also,
Chapter 285,
Laws of 1901.
Section 237.01.
Section 237.01.
Section 319.36.
Section 246.08.
Section 246.05.
Section 256.28,
Subsection 5.
Section 235.26.
Chapter 137.
Section 246.07.
Section 270.79,
Subsection 1.
Section( 272.05,
Subsection 9.
Section 241.08.
LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN WISCONSIN
Married women authorized to act as
trustee, executor or administrator.
Married woman who is attorney au-
thorized to act as assignee, receiver,
etc.
Conveyances between husbands and
wives legalized, etc.
Allowances consisting of family pic-
tures and fuel allowed to the widow-
Wife authorized to bring action for
alienation of affections of husband.
Assignment of husband's wages lim-
ited and void without signature of the
wife.
Alienation of the homestead for any
purpose void without the wife's signa-
ture.
Allowances of residue for support,
etc., increased to $500.
Allowance of residue increased to
$1,000.
Allowance increased to include all
household furniture.
The Eugenic Law enacted.
The widow made heir to one-half
personal property when one child and
one-third otherwise.
Limitation as to value of homestead
removed as between widow and the
heirs.
Allowance of residue of $1,000.
amended to apply to personal prop-
erty.
Dower increased to fee in one-third
all real estate outside the homestead.
Wife granted joint guardianship
rights with husband.
Curtesy limited not to apply on re-
marriage of widower.
Equal Rights Statute enacted.
Chapter 68, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1889.
Chapter 34,
Laws of 1891.
Chapter 86, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1895.
Chapter 76, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1901.
Chapter 17, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1905.
Chapter 148, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1905,
Section 1.
Chapter 45, Sec. 1.
Section 1.
Chapter 56, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1909.
Chapter 542, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1913.
Chapter 536, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1913.
Chapter 738, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1913.
Chapter 44, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1917.
Chapter 552, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1917.
Chapter 411, Sec. 2.
Laws of 1919.
Chapter 99, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1921.
Chapter 147, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1921.
Chapter 31, Sec. 1.
Laws of 1921.
Chapter 529, Secs. 1
and 2.
Laws of 1921.
Section 319.36.
Section 246.10.
Section 246.04.
Section 318.01,
Subsection 1.
Section 246.07.
Section 241.09.
Section 235.01.
Section 318.01,
Subsection 4.
Section 318.01.
Section 245.10.
Section 318.01,
Subsection 6.
Section 237.02,
Subsection 2.
Section 318.01,
Subsection 4.
Section 233.01.
Section 319.03.
Section 233.02.
Section 6.015.
No attempt has been made to trace the development of laws relating
to employment which, during the past few years have been completely
revised and enlarged, for the reason that it is not likely that the courts
will construe that women have, in obtaining so-called equality legisla-
tion, parted with the protective provisions applicable to industry given
under the cloak of legislation for the general welfare the police power.
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It is possible, however, that in the years to come situations may be
brought to issues where even some of -the protective provisions now
afforded to women in the industries may be modified.
A later article will treat further with the exceptional advantages of
women, under the law, in this state,--especially married women, as
contrasted with the numerous disabilities of men,-especially married
